Scotland and the democratic retreat: Rediscovering mass politics
In this edition, we explore some of the underlying dynamics at play in Scottish politics and democracy in the aftermath of the election, addressing themes around the impact of austerity and neoliberalism in hollowing out the public realm and reducing participation.
The managerial and technocratic approach to governance, which prioritises public relations and corporate interests, is combined with a stark decline in associational life and working-class representation. Addressing this requires the return of institution building and mass politics.
Holyrood 2026: A summary
In the aftermath of the Holyrood 2026 election, SNP leader John Swinney won plaudits from grateful party activists. Not so long ago, their political project had breached what felt like an existential crisis. The resignation of Nicola Sturgeon, a once-popular and untouchable leader, took place on the cusp of a police investigation into party finances. Bruising internal feuds followed, culminating in a short-lived spell at the helm for Humza Yousaf. Much of this now feels like a distant memory, as the SNP leadership prepare for another term in government after almost two decades in power.
Scotland’s new First Minister even received personal mention and praise from Donald Trump, in a social media post commending his role in negotiating tariff relief for the Scottish whisky industry. He “deserves this Big Electoral Victory,” declared the US President. Superficially, this is a curious juxtaposition, given the Scottish government in particular has drawn the ire of personalities on the American right for its “woke” credentials. As it happens, this neatly sums up the essence of Scotland’s governing class, which dramatises the culture war on the one hand, while corporate interests reign supreme on the other.
In this vein, Lorna Slater, who made a historic breakthrough for the Scottish Greens by winning a constituency seat, signed off on one of Scotland’s largest-ever PFI deals as a Green minister. The initiative is designed to empower corporations to further asset-strip Scotland under the guise of tackling environmental concerns, mirroring ScotWind and the privatisation of renewable energy. Such matters of national importance were all but absent from the election debates. The party returned a record number of MSPs, having successfully straddled the insurgent energies linked with Zack Polanski, in concert with their recent history of coalition government with the SNP. The Greens are now competitive beyond the regional list and can directly challenge in the first-past-the-post element of Scottish parliamentary elections. With Holly Bruce winning in Glasgow Southside, it may in the future be conceivable to talk of burgeoning Green “heartlands.” Their constituency triumphs unseated two high-profile SNP figures in the form of Angus Robertson and Kaukab Stewart.
Scottish Labour continues to face a long crisis, with something of a terminal quality, unmoored as it is from a cohesive and socially integrated base of support. Despite this overarching trend, there had been some cause for optimism. The 2023 crisis in the SNP opened up a fissure in the body politic that might have been exploited. In the 2024 general election, Labour won 37 seats, a gain of 36, while the SNP returned just 9 MPs, a reduction of 39. The health warning was always that this represented exhaustion with successive, calamitous, Tory governments more than it did enthusiasm for Starmer’s Labour.
The Prime Minister almost immediately skewered any potential revival with winter fuel payment cuts. After the Mandelson affair, Scottish leader Anas Sarwar had no option but to call for his own leader’s resignation. However, attempts to construct a cordone sanitaire around the UK government were to no avail. Scottish Labour’s campaign was replete with well-produced digital media, but relied much too heavily on criticising the SNP without setting out its own vision. Battle-worn, they return to Holyrood with a cohort of 17 MSPs. The party’s share of the vote declined by 24% compared to the last Scottish election in 2021.
Reform made a substantial breakthrough, equalling Labour’s complement of 17 representatives. The nascent party ran a confused and often tawdry campaign, attempting to twin a Thatcherite economic agenda with “populist” aesthetics focused on scapegoating immigrants and refugees, or as deputy-leader Thomas Kerr prefers, “strangers.” A slew of candidates failed to make it to polling day after a series of controversies were uncovered. Reform spokespeople appeared to be tinged with disappointment, especially as winning any constituency seats proved a step too far. Malcolm Offord, the party’s Scottish leader, came a poor third in Inverclyde with a paltry 5,649 votes. But there is no denying Reform’s performance on the regional lists, having attracted the support of 383,425 Scots. This is the first parliament of the devolution era to include a party of the radical right.
Constitutional dynamics continue to contour Scotland’s politics. The national question provides the SNP with an identifiable base, indispensable in a febrile and fractured environment. At the same time, there are also signs of erosion in this regard. The SNP’s constituency vote share was the lowest since 2007. In several contests, Reform arguably divided the pro-Union vote, benefiting the SNP, much to the dismay of the Scottish Conservatives. That said, returning 58 MSPs after so long in power showcases a durability that competitors can only envy.
Taken together with the Greens, Holyrood has a record number of independence-supporting MSPs and at 73 to 56, a clear majority, while the same obstacles and political opportunism surrounding the national question remain intact. The coming years are more likely to be dominated by swingeing cuts to the public sector, the continued primacy of the corporate lobby and a volatile geopolitical backdrop.
Non-voters in context
Commentators noted that the turnout was generally consistent with the rest of the devolution era, excluding the 2021 election. But that is far from the end of the matter. The turnout in the Easterhouse and Springburn constituency, for example, tells the story of a deeply felt alienation from official politics, in which the system as a whole has been rejected. Almost 60% of the electorate here did not take part. It is not difficult to work out why this is the case. Though hard won, the vote is widely perceived as having negligible capacity to materially improve conditions. This entrenches a democratic deficit in relation to social class and political representation, which contributes to a range of damaging effects.
You can, for instance, trace the relationship between voter turnout and life expectancy. The gap between people living in the least and most deprived areas of Glasgow is around 15.4 years for males and 11.6 years for females, as reported by the Glasgow Centre for Population Health. Between 2015–19, there was an estimated 17.6-year gap between males born in Greater Govan (65.4 years) versus Pollokshields West (83 years). The study highlights the impact of austerity and the decimation of the public realm as being a central cause of this stark inequality. This process has disproportionately impacted the most economically deprived, far removed from the corridors of power.
Austerity, therefore, is a political mechanism which has systematically weakened democratic accountability, as it unstitches what remains of the social fabric. It is not a new response to the recurring crises of the economic system, and can be traced to the period following the First World War. After the financial crash of 2008, austerity displaced the cost onto the working class, as wealth concentrated and expanded at the top of the system. As Clara Mattei argues, “the fiscal, monetary, and industrial measures that make up austerity are not, as they’re typically described, an economic war effort for the greater good. They are simply the crude tools for reestablishing the quiet disciplinary mechanisms that organize modern societies…austerity restabilises class relations and thus refurbishes the conditions for profits.”
The poorer you are, the shorter you will live, and the less likely you are to vote in elections. Research from the Fraser of Allander Institute further corroborates this pattern, concluding in a 2022 report that “health and income inequality are consistent predictors of voter turnout in Scotland.” This markedly intensified throughout the neoliberal period. In the 1987 UK general election, the turnout recorded for the poorest income group was 4% lower than for the wealthiest. By 2010, the gap had grown to a sobbering 23 points.
The 2014 independence movement
In recent Scottish history, one event in particular has bucked the trend in relation to self-organisation and mass political contestation. The 2014 independence campaign attracted broad social layers who had been politically dormant. This movement evaded the trappings of party politics and assumed a pluralistic character. Public meetings and other forms of activism were organised outside of the structures of the SNP, and indeed the official Yes campaign.
The debate itself moved well beyond legalistic and technocratic constitutional questions, into more fundamental discussions about power, democracy and what kind of country Scotland should be. As academics Malcolm Harvey and Alan Convery reflect in a paper on the referendum and political engagement: “The public meeting made a return to Scottish politics, with the demand for town hall meetings and public information events in some cases outstripping the supply.” Alongside mass canvassing events and the formation of myriad campaign groups, a renewal of political agency could be registered, which contributed to the 85% turnout on the day.
The popular momentum channelled through the independence movement would flow almost entirely into the SNP as a consequence of the No vote. When tens of thousands of people joined in the immediate aftermath, many on the left argued the political traction built up during the referendum could be incubated in the party and redirected towards projects for social and democratic transformation. This did not transpire. The latent potential to persist as a phenomenon of mass politics was effectivley defenestrated by a party machine.
In 2013, the SNP had around 20,000 members, before reaching a post-referendum peak of 125,000. As of June 2024, that number had fallen to 64,525. A level of attrition is natural and inescapable. But the scale of decline, combined with a receding and divided extra-parliamentary independence movement, exposes an underlying truth. Despite unrivalled political dominance, the SNP have a threadbare track record of delivery in the post-referendum era, which dealt more in headlines than implementation. Over the course of a decade, the prospectus for independence is incoherent even on core items such as membership of the European Union, currency and foreign policy.
Special advisors can present consecutive electoral victories as evidence of strategic success. But that only belies the extent to which politics has sunk into managerial mediocrity, devoid of substantive reform and without progress on the party’s stated purpose, Scottish independence.
Democratic recession
Governance has been reduced to an administrative process based on outsourcing, usually to the corporate sector, while millions have been spent on “spin” and public relations. Engagement in public policy demands the return of a mass politics which can shape the big debates of the era, and galvanise meaningful democratic tension between citizens and institutions. Without this, all that remains is a broadly interchangeable cast of administrators, selected from an ever-narrowing segment of the population, then disciplined by party hierarchies.
Addressing this is no easy task. As French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu puts it: “The neoliberal programme tends to destroy collective structures capable of obstructing the logic of the pure market.” As a result, the public sphere has retracted, and with it the democratic potential it yields. Trade unions have decreased in size and weakened in political influence. In 1979, over 13 million workers were unionised; now the figure is half that number. Universities have become hyper-competitive conveyor belts for a diminishing pool of graduate jobs, as marketisation constrains civic participation. Between 2020 and 2024, Scottish councils sold off 1,851 homes, schools, community centres and civic halls due to budget shortfalls.
The impact is society-wide. “Associational life,” say Volunteer Scotland, “refers to the activities that people do together with others, including volunteering, in an increasingly individualised society.” Decline in collective pursuits can be found in various ways, including in once influential institutions. In 1982, the Church of Scotland had nearly 920,000 members. Now the figure is around 270,000. In 1982, the Catholic church had 273 priests in training, compared to just 12 in 2021. Though sustained by committed people, there are also relative declines in clubs like the Boys Brigade, Beavers and Scouts. Meanwhile, formal volunteer participation fell by over 335,000 between 2019 and 2023.
In parallel with the deterioration of associational life, a cultural shift driven by the commodification of human relations has accelerated. In The Poverty of Philosophy, Karl Marx identified this trajectory in capitalism: “Finally, there came a time when everything that men had considered as inalienable became an object of exchange, of traffic and could be alienated. This is the time when the very things which till then had been communicated, but never exchanged; given, but never sold; acquired, but never bought – virtue, love, conviction, knowledge, conscience, etc. – when everything, in short, passed into commerce.”
Against such a backdrop, the concept of citizenship has been subverted by the ideologies of “consumer choice,” “self-care”, and individual performance metrics in a labour market where firms are seeking to replace “lower-value human capital” with Artificial Intelligence (AI). As Wendy Brown notes in Undoing the Demos: “The replacement of citizenship defined as concern with the public good…also eliminates the very idea of a people, a demos, asserting its collective political sovereignty.”
New and emerging challenges threaten further social atomisation. Bangor University researchers, for example, have been investigating the use of AI “companions” among teenagers. Most (56%) believe that AI systems used for companionship can “think or understand.” Almost a third (32%) report conversations with them as more satisfying than with their real-world friends. 52% of respondents confided in an AI companion about something “important or serious” at least once.
Within this frayed context, politics is largely conducted vicariously through personalities, as opposed to the democratic pressure once leveraged by mass formations. The parasocial relationship which developed between the independence movement and Nicola Sturgeon provides a case study in the costs and benefits of such an approach. Anton Jäger addresses the dilemma in Hyperpolitics: “Public life has become infused with protest, spectacle, and moral urgency - while the old infrastructure of parties, unions, and civic solidarity has been hollowed out.” At the same time, a sector of NGOs, often relying on government funding, has come to replace more independent and representative bodies of participation.
The overall result is a sterile and scripted politics, animated at the surface level by the dimensions of the “culture war,” while deeper and more complex questions of agency and power are submerged. It is little wonder, in conclusion, that only one MSP returned at this election comes directly from working-class employment, with the remainder drawn almost entirely from professional and managerial backgrounds.
Next week we will assess the ecclectic ideological foundations of the SNP, and explore what this might tell us to expect in the coming years.



Very good analysis. Consider this small example in East Renfrewshire. Both MSPS are now SNP. Both are Scot Gov Ministers. So, forget about asking either to take on any criticism of Scot Gov policies or indeed anything remotely controversial. Fall back to 7 List MSPs which include 3 national party leaders & one Depute PO. If I/we are lucky, I have identified and made contact with 2/7 List MSPs who might be receptive to taking up issues? That's it! The local MP is Labour, Junior UK Gov Minister. Democracy, wow!
The Easterhouse turnout figure runs through everything here. You can draw a straight line from 40% non-participation to life expectancy, to the drug death rate, to the ScotWind rental income leaving the communities that look at the turbines every day. The 2014 movement showed those people will engage when the stakes feel material rather than constitutional. The problem isn't that they've given up on politics - it's that politics has given up on delivering anything they can see.
The governing programme question your piece leaves open is the one that matters most: what makes participation feel rational again for Easterhouse? My answer is material change first, political trust second. A community that owns the turbines, has stable housing, can get drug treatment without a six-month wait - that community has a reason to show up. Not because independence is on the ballot but because the last five years produced something visible.
One thing worth adding to your ScotWind analysis: the TNUoS grid connection charging regime is as significant a barrier as the rental rate. Scottish renewable producers pay ten to twenty times more than English ones to connect to the grid - some ScotWind projects that had permission have been pushed out of the queue entirely because of it. The rental rate argument and the grid charging argument are both extraction mechanisms. The programme needs both as Westminster asks, not just one.